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The Role of SOF Direct Action in  
Counterinsurgency
Mark Schafer and Chris Fussell
One of the greatest challenges facing today’s counterinsurgency 
(COIN) campaign is that transnational extremists are fanning the 
flames of theater-level insurgency. Certain direct-action units within 
Special Operations have demonstrated an ability to remove these 
elements through surgical strikes. The conundrum is how to execute 
these operations without disrupting the local populace, thereby 
undermining the COIN effort. This essay offers one possible solution.
1. What is insurgency/COIN?
In simplest terms, an insurgency is an attempt by a smaller and less powerful 
force to overthrow an existing government, which is bigger and stronger 
than the insurgency. It is an internal struggle in which outside powers often 
find themselves entangled (e.g., the U.S. in today’s Afghanistan). Insurgency 
is one of several ways that an internal force or movement might attempt to 
overthrow an existing government (as opposed to a political coup, military 
coup, spontaneous revolution). It is a favored approach of resource-deprived 
groups who lack fighters, arms, and finances. Insurgencies employ certain 
tactics (e.g., terrorism) to weaken the delicate relationship between the state 
and the population, then exploit the seam created by the insurgent activities. 
As defined by Joint Publicaton 1-02, an insurgency is “an organized 
movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through 
use of subversion and armed conflict.” The French COIN theorist David 
Galula offers a more thorough definition in his classic 1964 study, Coun-
terinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, where he describes insurgency 
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as “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to 
attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of 
the existing order.” 1 
The state’s traditional role is to provide security and services (e.g., national 
army, legal system, and infrastructure) in return for cooperation from 
the population. The population reciprocates by following laws and paying 
taxes because they feel protected by the state. It is a relationship of trust. 
The insurgency attempts to weaken this relationship by making it appear 
to the population that the state is no longer able to maintain its part of the 
bargain, and a proven way to accomplish this is through the use of terror 
and guerrilla warfare. The nascent phase of an insurgency consists of two 
sides: a state that has the assets to strike the insurgent, but cannot see him; 
and an insurgent who can see the state’s forces, but lacks the resources to 
strike. Whichever side is able to overcome their deficiency first (the state’s 
information gap, or the insurgency’s resource gap) will move toward victory.2 
A well-organized insurgency, when facing a legitimate or semi-legitimate 
state, will first create pockets of anarchy to make the population see the 
government as incapable of providing protection and services—at which 
time the government is no longer fulfilling its core purpose and becomes 
illegitimate in the eyes of the polity. The insurgents can then offer them-
selves as the only viable option to provide security and stability. This allows 
the insurgency access to what it needs from the population—new recruits, 
weapons, and financing. An effective insurgency grows as the state slowly 
losses control of the population. 
The Taliban were born spontaneously in 1994 and by 1996 they controlled 
the majority of Afghanistan, to include the capital. They were able to rapidly 
conquer Afghanistan because the infighting and power struggles between 
Afghan warlords had created such a violent and unstable atmosphere follow-
ing the Soviet’s 1989 withdraw. That chaos drove the population willingly to 
the Taliban because the Taliban offered stability and security, albeit at the 
cost of Sharia Law.3 Although violent, the current environment in Afghani-
stan is not yet as unstable as the post-Soviet period of warlord infighting. 
Therefore, the Taliban are attempting to generate this chaos through the use 
of terror and guerrilla warfare in order to weaken the polity’s trust in the 
state. Such tactics, when successful, can convince the population that the 
state cannot protect them from violence. The Taliban can then capitalize 
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on the chaos they have generated and gain support from the population in 
the form of people, guns, and money, threatening to unseat the government. 
A successful COIN must convince the population that the state is the 
most reliable element of power and capable of providing security. Histori-
cally, successful COINs have been those in which the state has managed 
to maintain or regain the confidence of the population. This is where the 
hearts-and-minds argument originates. As an insurgency grows, the state 
must work to convince the people, both emotionally and intellectually, that 
the government is still in control and will provide protection and services. 
Launching large-scale attacks against insurgents is commonly criticized as 
an approach to defeating them. Typically, the state pursues the insurgents 
with blunt attacks before they can truly see the insurgents, thereby lead-
ing to increased danger for the population because the insurgents are very 
difficult to differentiate from innocent civilians (and many locals are a little 
bit of both). The insurgency can then exploit these blunt actions, further 
delegitimize the state in the eyes of the citizenry, and gain support from the 
population. To break this cycle the state must first control the population 
and regain their confidence; only then will the insurgents become visible. 
This concept is at the root of General McChrystal’s revised approach to the 
COIN in Afghanistan: “Protecting the Afghan people is the mission. The 
Afghan people will decide who wins this fight, and we [the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and International Security Assistance 
Force] are in a struggle for their support.” 4 All activities must flow from 
and support this overarching strategic concept.
2. SOF Direct Action and How it Applies to COIN
Counter-Network Warfare. The Special Operations community and inter-
agency partners have, since 9-11, created a network that mirrors, watches, 
and out-maneuvers the enemy’s network. This capability can be applied to 
a global enemy network, as well as a localized insurgent network. Recall the 
popular phrase: It takes a network to defeat a network.5 
The enemy network moves fast, but a highly focused and highly commu-
nicative element can move faster. Parts of the Special Operations community 
have organized themselves as a robustly connected network that overlays 
the transnational enemy network. They have combined this structure with 
unparalleled connectivity and seasoned interagency relationships to create 
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an organization capable of tracking and countering the enemy’s network 
in near real time. These counter-network operations target the irreconcil-
ables—those committed radicals who will plague the campaign as long as 
they are on the battlefield.6 In Afghanistan, these are ultracommitted indi-
viduals (some indigenous, some transnational) with the connectivity and 
resources to significantly disrupt COIN efforts and the skill level to avoid 
being captured or killed during clear-hold-build operations. 
But how does this unique counter-network capability apply to the COIN 
environment? The often-cited center of gravity in COIN is the population. 
The counterinsurgent must control and secure the population in order 
to expose the insurgent fighters. Only then can the enemy be accurately 
targeted in such a manner as to avoid creating accidental guerrillas.7 It would 
appear that direct-action operations could be counterproductive in such a 
campaign; indeed, this is likely the case if these operations are not properly 
coordinated with the strategic campaign. If improperly sequenced or insuf-
ficiently integrated with the vision of the theater commander, direct-action 
missions could actually extend the lifespan of an insurgency by aggravat-
ing and alienating the population. However, with proper coordination and 
execution, the pinpoint accuracy of the well-executed direct-action missions 
will greatly enhance the effectiveness of a larger COIN campaign. 
In today’s conflicts there are two levels of enemy network, local insurgents 
and transnational elements. The lines between these two are often hazy, but 
both can be targeted in support of the COIN campaign. The transnational 
network is comprised of ultracommitted individuals who are able to finance, 
train, equip, inspire, and direct the insurgents. The U.S. saw examples of 
this network when Al Qaeda in Iraq, led by Jordanian-born Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi, was able to utilize both foreign and Iraqi insurgents. The Al 
Qaeda Central (AQC) ability to influence the Taliban insurgency in Afghani-
stan is another example. Their network is largely effective because of its 
ability to move key personnel in and out of the battlefield, thereby influenc-
ing events with a minimal amount of people relative to the number of local 
fighters (consider the ratio of Al Qaeda to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan). 
AQC’s ability to move personnel quickly, maintain operational security, 
and employ sophisticated communications procedures makes them elusive 
targets. Yet while the AQC network has relatively few members, they are an 
element that must be dealt with as they have nested influence throughout 
the insurgency and tend to be the most radically committed players.
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Certain Special Operations elements have a unique capability to address 
this network of indigenous and transnational radicals and are therefore a 
key component of today’s COIN fight. A significant and unique strength 
of these forces is the combined effectiveness of highly skilled tacticians, a 
robust package of assets, and a networked command and intelligence support 
system. The deliberate and coordinated application of counter-network 
operations is a key component of today’s COIN campaign.
Counter-Network Operations in a COIN Environment. An effective Special 
Operations direct-action unit is a sum of its parts. Experienced operators 
and robust assets are supported by a global intelligence network to create 
a force package capable of rapidly pursuing the enemy network in difficult 
or denied areas.
There are two main areas where Special Operations elements can support 
a COIN campaign; their counter-network capability gives them a compara-
tive advantage to execute these operations with great speed and accuracy:
a. Preparation for Clear-Hold-Build. When properly sequenced, the 
ability of an effective direct-action unit to penetrate denied areas 
will act as a shaping operation for the clear-hold-build strategy of a 
larger force. Prior to the clearance portion of a COIN operation, these 
elements can be utilized for surgical direct-action missions targeting 
key insurgent leadership in the area to be cleared. These operations 
will not destroy the resistance; conventional forces will still face a fight 
to clear and hold the location. However, the pinpoint operations of 
these forces can remove key leadership in order to reduce the overall 
effectiveness of the insurgent network prior to the large-scale clear-
ance operations. Timing is absolutely critical. Insurgents can exploit 
the collateral effects of direct-action missions and foster even stronger 
resistance to eventual clear-hold-build operations if there is a gap (time 
or space) between the execution of direct-action missions and follow-
on clear-hold operations of the larger force. Shaping operations must 
be considered in terms of hours before clearing operations, not days.
b. Sanctuary Disruption. Past operations have shown that during the 
hold-and-build portions of COIN a significant number of the insur-
gents who survived clearance operations will move to sanctuaries 
where they are able to refit and plan future operations. There will 
also be a contingent of fighters who remain hidden (or just living) 
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among the populace. Hold-and-build operations will isolate this 
second group of insurgents from their network, and as conventional 
forces provide greater levels of security for the local population, the 
insurgents hiding among the populace can be ferreted out in large part 
by General Purpose Forces (GPF).8 But SOF direct-action units have 
a significant comparative advantage in their ability to protect hold-
and-build operations from insurgents operating out of sanctuaries.9 
While direct-action units will not occupy these sanctuaries, they can 
effectively disrupt them and make the enemy’s ability to stage for and 
plan operations that much less effective. These sanctuary disruption 
operations will provide space and time for the larger force to conduct 
the difficult task of occupation and reconstruction.10
The Coordination Imperative
Coordination between units is too often confused with deconfliction. Inform-
ing units when and where you will be in their battle space is deconfliction. 
Ensuring that all operations are synchronized toward a common strategic 
goal is coordination. Deconfliction is one of many steps in the mission-
planning process, while coordination must be an ever-present part of how 
all units look at their operations. Effective coordination will eventually drive 
operations; deconfliction will not.
Nonsynchronized operations can lead to individual successes for units 
while making no strategic advances. Coordination must be seen as an 
imperative in counter-network operations within a COIN environment. 
Proactive efforts are required at every level of coordination. Liaison officer 
exchanges and intelligence fusion cells are good examples of an effort to 
coordinate. Most importantly, officers in those positions must be informed 
and empowered to actually do the substantive coordination required and 
synchronize operations.
The inherent differences among coalition forces are, remarkably, enough 
to stifle the coordination imperative and hinder strategic gains. Differ-
ences in military service cultures, jargon, and appearances are petty, but 
have proven substantial enough to stymie effective coordination. Cultural 
differences lead to avoidance, which then leads to isolation and disunity of 
effort. Compound this issue with the challenges of using different computer 
networks, working in separate compounds, and reporting through differ-
ent chains of command and one can quickly see that coordination requires 
87
Schafer and Fussell: The Role of SOF Direct Action in COIN
a disciplined effort. If units are not interacting, sharing information, and 
coordinating their efforts to the point of discomfort, they are not meeting 
the minimum standard of the coordination imperative. Without this, as 
over 8 years in Afghanistan have shown, our forces will execute countless 
commendable operations without consistent strategic gains.
Summary
SOF direct-action units fill the distinct role of counter-network operations 
within a COIN campaign. This essay proposes that these forces are best 
employed as the vanguard for larger clear-hold-build operations and as a 
surgical force to disrupt the insurgents’ sanctuaries. The coordination impera-
tive will ensure that offensive counter-network operations are designed to 
best complement the overarching COIN strategy, mitigating the secondary 
effects involved with rooting out the irreconcilable insurgent leaders. Only 
effective coordination can ensure that counter-network operations are 
properly focused on the goal of providing space in which larger forces can 
execute the highly complex mission of COIN.11
3. Application to Afghanistan’s Insurgency
Coalition forces must never forget that they are fighting a thinking enemy 
in Afghanistan. The enemy has many years of battlefield experience. He 
fights on his terrain. The battles take place in his culture. When coalition 
forces redeploy to rest, refit, and train, the enemy remains in or very close 
to the fight. As long as the enemy is on the battlefield, his skill set grows 
exponentially. These are significant advantages. Therefore, today’s leadership 
must outthink the enemy—on our terms and his terms. 
To win in Afghanistan, the ability of the Taliban to grow must be destroyed. 
There are two basic ways in which an otherwise neutral Afghan male might 
come to join the Taliban insurgency: intimidation by the insurgents or being 
driven to volunteerism. Traditionally, direct-action forces would prefer to 
focus on the former—intimidation by the insurgents. But a thinking enemy 
is focused on the latter—gaining numbers through volunteerism.
Fighting on our terms. In the first scenario, insurgents use severe intimida-
tion against the population. Direct-action units are the good guys seeking 
to protect the population from this cruelty, while the insurgents are the bad 
guys using extreme violence and threats to intimidate the local populace into 
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joining their ranks. In this scenario, direct-action forces do their best work. 
These units track, target, and remove evil elements from the battlefield in 
a highly effective manner. This, one would reason, should gain the support 
of the population. On our terms, direct-action forces are removing very bad 
actors and ending their tactics of intimidation and violence. On our terms, 
defeating the insurgency is a straightforward contest, and the population 
will appreciate our efforts.
Fighting on his terms. A thinking enemy prefers the second scenario—
volunteerism. In this scenario, the population willingly joins the enemy’s 
ranks and offers support. The insurgents know how skilled coalition forces 
are in targeting and kinetics. However, the insurgent also understands 
Afghan cultural norms, how coalition forces operate, and how to exploit those 
actions. While a kinetic action might remove a very bad actor (our terms), 
the thinking enemy is prepared for this loss and stands ready to exploit the 
action. The thinking enemy moves in quickly and quietly and plays to the 
cultural norms within the village or valley, offering his force as the only 
legitimate avenue to regain pride and self-rule. When this approach gains 
two new insurgents for the one that was removed, the thinking enemy wins. 
The challenge is to break this cycle. When coalition forces outthink the 
enemy on his terms, the volunteer avenue is diminished. The insurgency will 
always need new members, so without volunteerism it must revert to our 
terms—intimidation of the population. When the enemy uses intimidation 
he is alienated from the population, making him more visible and therefore 
more targetable. Improved target-
ing shrinks the insurgency while 
increasing the legitimacy of the 
COIN force and the government in 
the eyes of the population. This is 
the path to victory, but requires extensive coordination amongst all elements.
The challenge then is to win on our terms where the direct-action forces 
are incredibly effective and his terms where the enemy’s strength lies and 
the most rigorous thought process begins. This is not to say simply reduce 
kinetic targeting; rather, it proposes that direct-action operations are a 
critical component of the COIN effort when synchronized with the entire 
battlefield. Coordination is an imperative and must be tirelessly enforced 
throughout every tactical operation. The thinking enemy’s follow-on actions 
When the enemy uses intimidation 
he is alienated from the population, 
making him more visible and there-
fore more targetable. 
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must be countered. Coalition units must work as a synchronized element in 
pursuit of one common strategic goal. If the United States hopes to defeat this 
thinking enemy who possesses very dangerous comparative advantages, the 
efforts of direct-action units must be a coordinated part of the continuum 
of operations. That is the true test for our leadership.
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